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TESTIMONY OF ROBERT A. PECK  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

FEBRUARY 25, 1988

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, THIS HEARING PROVIDES A TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS HAS RECENTLY QUICKENED, AND HOPES HAVE BEEN RASIED FOR AN EARLY SOLUTION. THE GENEVA PROXIMITY TALKS RESUME NEXT WEEK IN WHAT COULD BE A CRUCIAL SESSION. I WILL BE HAPPY TO REVIEW U.S. OBJECTIVES, AND TO DISCUSS OUR PERSPECTIVE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

## BACKGROUND

U.S. POLICY SINCE THE SOVIET OCCUPATION IN DECEMBER 1979 HAS BEEN FOCUSSED -- IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCCESSIVE UNGA RESOLUTIONS -- ON ACHIEVING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, RETURN OF THE REFUGEES IN SAFETY AND HONOR, AN INDEPENDENT AND NONALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

WE HAVE PURSUED THESE OBJECTIVES THROUGH A MIX OF POLICIES

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WHICH HAVE ENJOYED THE STRONG BIPARTISAN SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. WE ARE PROUD OF OUR RECORD OF SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS WHOSE VALIANT STRUGGLE, AFTER EIGHT BLOODY YEARS OF CONFLICT, HAS CREATED THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESTORATION OF AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE. WE ARE EQUALLY PROUD OF OUR ASSOCIATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN WHO HAVE BORNE A GREAT BURDEN IN SHELTERING THE LARGEST REFUGEE COMMUNITY IN THE WORLD TODAY. WE HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL, AND HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, TO PROMOTE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND THE END OF THE SOVIET OCCUPATION. CURRENTLY THERE IS A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THE FRAMEWORK AND INDIVIDUAL TEXTS OF A SETTLEMENT REACHED IN PROXIMITY TALKS HELD OVER SIX YEARS IN GENEVA BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND THE KABUL REGIME.

HOWEVER, KEY ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED. THE U.S. HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT IT WOULD BE WILLING TO PLAY AN APPROPRIATE GUARANTOR'S ROLE IN A SETTLEMENT AT GENEVA, PROVIDED WE ARE SATISFIED WITH THE SETTLEMENT AND THAT IT WILL RESULT IN ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR LONG-STANDING POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR AFGHANISTAN. THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS ASKED A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STATUS OF THESE TALKS.

#### GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS

AS A RESULT OF HIS RECENTLY COMPLETED SHUTTLE IN THE AREA, MR. CORDOVEZ HAS SET MARCH 2 AS THE DATE THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND

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WILL COMMENCE. THE NEGOTIATORS WILL BE WORKING FROM THE TEXT OF FOUR "INSTRUMENTS" COVERING:

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O MUTUAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING NON-INTERFERENCE AND NON-INTERVENTION.

O INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES.

O RETURN OF THE REFUGEES.

O THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF SETTLEMENT INSTRUMENTS.

THESE DOCUMENTS ARE CONSIDERED ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF WITHDRAWAL DETAILS IN INSTRUMENT FOUR.

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE LAST GENEVA ROUND, PAKISTAN HAD PROPOSED A WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE OF 8 MONTHS. THE CURRENT SOVIET PROPOSAL, CONVEYED IN GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S FEBRUARY 8 STATEMENT, IS A 100MONTH WITHDRAWAL. IN ADDITION, MR. GORBACHEV HAS ACCEPTED THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF FRONT-LOADING, THAT IS, THAT A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN WITHIN A SPECIFIED EARLY PERIOD. NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA ARE LIKELY TO FOCUS BOTH ON THE LENGTH OF THE TIMETABLE AND THE MODALITIES FOR CONDUCT OF THE WITHDRAWAL. ONLY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE DETAILS OF AN

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CONSTRUCTIVE WAY TO CONDUCT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. THE MOST  
IMPORTANT THING IS TO ~~WALK~~ ~~DOWN~~ ~~AN~~ ~~AGREEMENT~~ ~~WHICH~~ ~~TRULY~~  
~~ADDRESSES~~ ~~OUR~~ ~~LONG-TERM~~ ~~GOALS~~ ~~WE~~ ~~WANT~~ ~~SOVIET~~ ~~WITHDRAWALS~~ ~~TO~~  
BEGIN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, AND INDEED CONTINUE TO BELIEVE  
THAT THEY SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR AT THE  
VERY LATEST. IF THERE IS SERIOUS INTENT TO SETTLE THIS  
MATTER--AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT IS THE CASE FOR THE UNITED  
STATES AND FOR PAKISTAN--THERE IS NO REASON WHY THAT GOAL  
CANNOT BE MET. THIS IS THE MESSAGE THE SECRETARY CARRIED TO  
THE SOVIET UNION EARLIER THIS WEEK.

#### INTERIM GOVERNMENT

THE MANDATE OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ESTABLISHED BY  
AGREEMENT AMONG THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT, THE KABUL REGIME, AND  
THE UNITED NATIONS DOES NOT INCLUDE INTERNAL AFGHAN POLITICAL  
QUESTIONS. HOWEVER, STABILITY WITHIN AFGHANISTAN IS IMPOSSIBLE  
WITHOUT THE EMERGENCE OF A GOVERNMENT WHICH IS VIEWED BY  
AFGHANS AS LEGITIMATE AND WHICH IS BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE OF  
AFGHAN OPINION. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALWAYS TAKEN THIS  
POSITION, AND THE UNGA RESOLUTIONS AFFIRM THE AFGHAN RIGHT TO  
SELF-DETERMINATION. AS THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENEVA SETTLEMENT  
HAS BRIGHTENED, INCREASING ATTENTION HAS BEEN DIRECTED BY ALL  
THE PARTIES TO THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON A GOVERNMENT AMONG THE  
AFGHANS. THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES, OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, HAVE  
SOUGHT TO PROMOTE A COALITION INCLUDING NON-PDPA ELEMENTS.



THOUGH THESE BELATED EFFORTS HAVE NOT PROSPERED. IN PART  
BECAUSE OF THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE SMALL POPULATION IN KABUL  
TO CEDE REAL POWER. THE SOVIETS NOW APPEAR TO HAVE LOST  
PATIENCE WITH THESE POLITICAL EFFORTS. AND WISH TO MOVE FORWARD  
WITH A SETTLEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON THE  
FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT.

NOW THAT THE SHAPE AND BASIC CONTENT OF THE GENEVA  
AGREEMENT HAS CLEARLY EMERGED, THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT HAS  
GIVEN NEW EMPHASIS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INTERNAL AFGHAN  
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. PAKISTAN HAS PROPOSED THE FORMATION OF A  
BROAD-BASED INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD ACT AS THE AFGHAN  
HIGH CONTRACTING PARTY IN SIGNING THE GENEVA ACCORDS AND SERVE  
DURING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WHILE SOVIET TROOPS ARE EXITING  
AFGHANISTAN. THE PAKISTANIS POINT OUT THAT SUCH A GOVERNMENT  
WOULD ENCOURAGE AN EARLY RETURN OF THE REFUGEES, A KEY  
PAKISTANI INTEREST, AND WOULD MINIMIZE THE TURMOIL, BLOODSHED  
AND REPRISALS WHICH MAY OTHERWISE OCCUR. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE  
ENCOURAGED THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE TO PUT FORWARD A  
PROPOSAL FOR SUCH A GOVERNMENT, AND HAVE WELCOMED THE EFFORTS  
OF MR. CORDOVEZ -- OUTSIDE THE OFFICIAL MANDATE OF THE GENEVA  
PROCESS -- TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE  
AFGHAN PARTIES TO THIS END.

WE BELIEVE THAT FORMATION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IS  
HIGHLY DESIRABLE AND THAT URGENT EFFORTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO

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PROMOTE AN AGREEMENT AMONG THE AFGHAN PARTIES. A GENEVA SETTLEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE MORE SATISFACTORY IF A BROAD-BASED AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WERE IN PLACE TO SIGN AND IMPLEMENT IT. THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE IN THE INTEREST OF EVERYONE -- INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION. SECRETARY SHULTZ MADE THIS POINT IN MOSCOW AND URGED MOST RAPID EFFORTS. THE MAJOR QUESTION THAT MUST BE RAISED CONCERNS THE FEASIBILITY AND LIKELY DURATION OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, AND WHETHER SIGNATURE OF AN OTHERWISE SATISFACTORY GENEVA SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE DELAYED PENDING THE SUCCESS OF INTRA-AFGHAN TALKS.

THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN -- WHETHER INTERIM OR FINAL -- LIES WITH THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES. AND WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN WHEN DECISIONS MAY BE MADE. OUR IMMEDIATE GOAL IS THE EARLY, COMPLETE AND IRREVERSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES UNDER CONDITIONS WE AND THE GOP DEEM SATISFACTORY. IF THAT APPEARS ATTAINABLE, AND WE ARE FULLY SATISFIED THAT OUR OBJECTIVES WILL BE MET, THE UNITED STATES WOULD CERTAINLY NOT STAND IN THE WAY SHOULD PAKISTAN DECIDE TO GO AHEAD, NOR WOULD WE CEASE TO ASSIST IN THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROAD-BASED AFGHAN GOVERNMENT.

#### AFGHAN ALLIANCE POSITION

THE POSITION OF THE AFGHAN ALLIANCE HAS EVOLVED

SIGNIFICANTLY IN RESPONSE TO RECENT EVENTS. THE ALLIANCE LEADERSHIP HAS OFFERED A CEASEFIRE FOR DEPARTING SOVIET TROOPS, AMNESTY FOR REGIME-CONNECTED AFGHANS, [WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS], AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN WITH GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBORS. THE LEADERSHIP MET WITH MR. CORDOVEZ DURING HIS RECENT SHUTTLE AND CONVEYED THEIR VIEWS ON A SETTLEMENT. THE ALLIANCE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY PUT FORWARD A DETAILED POLITICAL PROPOSAL FOR FORMATION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS PROPOSAL HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO MR. CORDOVEZ, AND THAT IT IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER NEGOTIATION. WE HOPE THAT THE KABUL REGIME WILL RESPOND WITH SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS.

WHILE RESISTANCE LEADERS HAVE BEEN SUSPICIOUS OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, THEY NOW HAVE INDICATED THAT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, FORMED ALONG THE LINES THEY HAVE SUGGESTED, COULD SIGN AT GENEVA. THE RECENT RETURN OF DISTINGUISHED AFGHAN EMIGRES TO PESHAWAR, APPARENTLY AT ALLIANCE REQUEST, PROVIDES EVIDENCE OF A DESIRE TO REACH OUT TO OTHER ELEMENTS. AFGHAN RESISTANCE OPPOSITION TO ANY ROLE IN A FUTURE GOVERNMENT FOR PDPA MEMBERS APPEARS TO RUN DEEP, BUT THERE HAS BEEN AN EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT "GOOD MUSLIMS" LIVING IN KABUL, WHICH IMPLIES THAT SOME PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRESENT REGIME MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE AS INDIVIDUALS.

#### SOVIET INTENTIONS

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JUDGMENTS REGARDING SOVIET INTENTIONS REMAIN CRUCIAL TO ANY PREDICTIONS REGARDING THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS TO SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY AGREEMENTS WHICH MAY BE REACHED. THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS WHY THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE SEEKING AN END TO THEIR AFGHAN ADVENTURE. THE MILITARY PRESSURE EXERTED BY THE RESISTANCE CONTINUES TO MOUNT; THOUGH THE SOVIETS ARE IN NO DANGER OF MILITARY DEFEAT, THEY ALSO DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANY ACCEPTABLE MILITARY MEANS OF ACHIEVING THEIR OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN. SIMILARLY THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COSTS OF THEIR INTERVENTION SHOW NO SIGNS OF DIMINISHING. AND EVEN THE MOST OPTIMISTIC SOVIET MUST NOW ADMIT THAT SOVIET EFFORTS TO CREATE AN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND ARMY WHICH COULD BEGIN TO TAKE HOLD AND, OVER TIME, REDUCE THE SOVIET COMMITMENT HAVE FAILED.

THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 8 APPEARS TO BE A GENUINE STATEMENT OF SOVIET INTENT TO END THEIR DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. SIGNIFICANTLY, A GOOD PORTION OF THIS STATEMENT SEEMED AIMED AT HIS DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, SUGGESTING AN ATTEMPT TO PREPARE THE SOVIET PEOPLE FOR WITHDRAWAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE. NONETHELESS, WE CANNOT KNOW WHAT POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS MAY LIE BEHIND THE PRESENT CONSENSUS, NOR WITH ANY CERTAINTY HOW THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT REACT UNDER A VARIETY OF FUTURE CONTINGENCIES, INCLUDING THE LIKELY POSSIBILITY THAT SURVIVAL OF THE NAJIB REGIME WILL BE THREATENED, POSSIBLY EVEN BEFORE

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SOVIET WITHDRAWALS ARE COMPLETED. WE ARE USING OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS TO ATTAIN A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW ANY AGREEMENT WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED, AND THE JUDGMENTS WHICH WE REACH AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THE DECISIONS WHICH WE MAY BE REQUIRED TO MAKE AS A POTENTIAL GUARANTOR.

### SURVIVABILITY OF NAJIB REGIME

THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS ALSO ASKED FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S JUDGMENT ON THE LIKELY POLITICAL OUTCOME WITHIN AFGHANISTAN IF SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES CURRENTLY BEING DISCUSSED IS IMPLEMENTED. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT A PDPA-DOMINATED REGIME CANNOT SURVIVE A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. SOVIET TROOPS INVADED ORIGINALLY TO PROP UP A PDPA REGIME THREATENED BY A SPONTANEOUS AFGHAN RESISTANCE WHICH HAD EMERGED WITH NO SIGNIFICANT OUTSIDE SUPPORT. SUBSEQUENT PDPA REGIMES HAVE FAILED TO PUT DOWN ROOTS, IN PART BECAUSE THEY ARE THOROUGHLY STIGMATIZED BY THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE HATED SOVIET ARMY OF OCCUPATION IN PART BECAUSE OF THE RECORD OF OPPRESSION AND SAVAGE BRUTALITY TOWARD THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH THE AFGHAN SECRET POLICE HELPS TO PUT A LITTLE SPINE INTO THE REGIME, ESPECIALLY IN KABUL, THE AFGHAN ARMY REMAINS A SHAKY, UNDERMANNED, AND INEFFECTIVE INSTITUTION. ALMOST ALL EFFECTIVE FIGHTING HAS INVOLVED USE OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES TOGETHER WITH AFGHANS, AS WELL AS SOVIET AIR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT. THIS WILL BE GONE ONCE THE SOVIETS

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START TO PULL OUT. THE PRINCIPAL VARIABLE IN OUR CALCULATIONS IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE RESISTANCE MAY ACT IN A COORDINATED FASHION TO UNSEAT THE PDPA REGIME. OUR ESTIMATE IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD SPLINTER AND FALL OF ITS OWN WEIGHT EVEN BEFORE THE FINAL SOVIET PULLOUT [THOUGH THE SOVIETS WILL DEPLOY FORCES IN KABUL TILL THE END IN ORDER TO TRY TO PREVENT SUCH AN OUTCOME]. ONCE THE SOVIET PROTECTORS ARE GONE, THE REGIME WILL BE UNABLE TO PROJECT POWER INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE, AND ITS EARLY DEMISE WILL BE INEVITABLE.

### AMERICAN POLICY

THE DRAFT GENEVA SETTLEMENT PROVIDES FOR A "GUARANTOR" ROLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. WE ARE PREPARED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO ACCEPT SUCH A ROLE PROVIDED THAT WE ARE FULLY SATISFIED THAT THE COMPLETED AGREEMENT WILL ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES. THESE OBJECTIVES ARE AN ACCEPTABLY STRUCTURED SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES, AND THE RESTORATION OF AN INDEPENDENT AND NONALIGNED AFGHANISTAN WITHIN WHICH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE CAN EXERCISE THEIR INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THAT WAS OUR POLICY IN DECEMBER 1985, AND THAT IS OUR POLICY NOW. IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY. OUR POSITION HAS BEEN STATED AND RESTATED PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO THE SOVIETS, THE PAKISTANIS, THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE, THE UNGA AND THE CONGRESS. IT WILL NOT CHANGE.

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THE OBLIGATION WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD UNDERTAKE AS A "GUARANTOR" WOULD RELATE EXCLUSIVELY TO OUR OWN POLICIES AND ACTIONS. WE WOULD BEAR NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF OTHERS, OR FOR THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AS A WHOLE. WE AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AGREE TO THE SAME BASIC COMMITMENT REGARDING NON-INTERFERENCE AND NON-INTERVENTION. WE WOULD BE PREPARED, IF COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH THE OVERALL AGREEMENT, TO PROHIBIT U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. WE WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO SHOW RECIPROCAL RESTRAINT UNDER THE GENEVA ACCORDS IN STOPPING ITS MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE KABUL REGIME INSTRUMENT ON GUARANTEES. WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE NON-MILITARY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ASSUME THE SOVIETS WILL DO THE SAME. THE COMMITMENTS OF ALL THE PARTIES WOULD ENTER INTO EFFECT ON AN AGREED DATE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE; AT THE PRESENT TIME THIS IS EXPECTED TO BE AT THE END OF 60 DAYS.

WE MAY BE ON THE THRESHOLD OF AN HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT. WE PLACE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITIES INHERENT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO REACH AN EARLY SETTLEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE DETERMINED THAT IT MUST BE A GOOD SETTLEMENT, A SETTLEMENT WHICH GETS SOVIET FORCES OUT, RESULTS IN THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES, AND WHICH RESTORES THE INDEPENDENCE AND NONALIGNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE RIGHT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO SELF-DETERMINATION. ALL OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE BENT TOWARD THIS RESULT.

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